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BEYOND PEOPLE V. CASTRO: A NEW
STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY FOR
DNA FINGERPRINTING
Forensic science' employs a wide range of identification techniques2 in an
effort to link physical evidence to a particular individual. Forensic serolo-
gists3 attempt to identify suspects from traces of blood, semen, saliva, or
urine.4 The most recent and potentially greatest contribution to forensic sci-
ence is DNA typing.5 The so-called "DNA fingerprint"6 has evolved from
the fields of molecular biology, chemistry, and population genetics,7 and of-
fers a new and potentially more precise way to establish the identity of
1. Forensic science in its broadest definition is the application of science to law. As
our society has grown more complex it has become more dependant on rules of law
to regulate the activities of its members. Forensic science offers the knowledge and
technology of science to the definition and enforcement of such laws.
R. SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 1 (1981).
2. The forensic scientist attempts to identify the origin of trace evidence left at the crime
scene, including paint, fibers, hair, glass, soil, metals, and flammable and explosive residue.
Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 661
(1984). Other techniques include traditional fingerprinting and other, more exotic techniques,
such as spectrographic examination (voiceprint). See generally P. GIANNELLI & E. IM-
WINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1986) [hereinafter GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED].
3. "Forensic serology consists of the identification and characterization of blood and
other body fluids in the crime laboratory." FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HAND-
BOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 30 (1984).
4. Id. at 31-32. Some genetic identification techniques include blood group (ABO) typ-
ing, human leukocyte antigen typing (HLA), neuron activation analysis (NAA), and gel elec-
trophoresis. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75. VA. L. REV. 45, 51 (1989) [hereinafter Thompson & Ford]. Each of
these techniques is limited, although gel electrophoresis offers the greatest specificity through
the typing of red blood cell enzymes and serum proteins. Id. For an overview of each of these
techniques, see GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 7. The admissibility of gel
electrophoresis has undergone a series of challenges and its future in the courts is uncertain.
See generally Note, The Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain
Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 773 (1986).
5. Practical use of DNA typing first came into existence in 1985 through the pioneering
efforts of Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester in England. Comment, DNA Identifi-
cation Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903, 908 n.22 (1988) [hereinafter Identification
Tests]. The first reported use of the tests was in the Pitchfork double murder case in England.
The story of Colin Pitchfork and the Narborough Village murders is the subject of a non-
fiction account by J. WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING (1989) [hereinafter J. WAMBAUGH].
6. The technique is also referred to as DNA typing, DNA profiling, and DNA print
identification. Although at least one court has objected to the use of the term "DNA finger-
printing," see infra note 30, these terms will nevertheless be used interchangeably.
7. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 56-57.
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suspects. s
Since the advent of DNA typing, United States courts have addressed
DNA identification evidence in both civil and criminal matters. In paternity
suits, the technique is used widely and has quickly established itself as the
preferred method for linking putative father to child.9 DNA evidence has
also been introduced, and almost always admitted, in scores of criminal
cases. ° However, while DNA technology has been heralded by prosecutors
8. Among the more optimistic statements: "Other tests can exclude a man or suggest
he's guilty. This one can positively nail him." Lewis, DNA Fingerprints: Witnessfor the Prose-
cution, DISCOVER, June 1988, at 47. High visibility cases, such as the disappearance of Melissa
Brannen, a Fairfax, Virginia 5-year-old, prominently feature the DNA typing procedure. See
Thomas & Davis, Genetic Tests Awaited in Brannen, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1989, at Bl, col. 1.
In addition to its legal applications, reports have associated "DNA fingerprinting" with the
tasks of tracking elephant poachers in Africa, DNA Fingerprinting May Help Track Poachers,
U.P.I., Sept. 25, 1989 (NEXIS, Wires file), studying the breeding pattern of the purple martin,
Okie, Genetics: Clues to Birds' Behavior, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1989, at A2, col. 4, proving
Indian alienage in England, Campaign to Unite Indian Families, Daily Tel., May 10, 1989, at
4; see also Jeffreys, Brookfield & Semeonoff, Positive Identification of an Immigration Test-Case
Using Human DNA Fingerprints, 317 NATURE 818, 818-19 (1985), and is said to be valuable in
breeding condors. Phillips, DNA Fingerprints, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, § 2, at 3, col. 1
(home ed.). Physicians and hospitals may offer the new technology to replace baby bracelets,
footprinting, and fingerprinting as a method for infant identification.
Healthcare professionals have realized the need for accurate identification as a form
of protection in the event of a major catastrophe, or individual disappearance. This
procedure offers accurate identification through the most scientifically advanced, up
to date technology. LIFEBANK offers the peace of mind of providing DNA com-
parison upon your request. For only pennies a day, the LIFEBANK services pro-
vide the security should a catastrophic event, or disappearance occur.
Advertisement for Lifebank, Inc., CHILD, Mar. 1990, at 130.
9. See generally Kaye, DNA Paternity Probabilities, 24 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1990) (discussing
issues in DNA paternity testing). A report from one laboratory, Cellmark Diagnostics of Ger-
mantown, Maryland, which performs testing for both criminal and civil proceedings, claims
that within a 14 month period it performed over 2000 tests for paternity cases, not one of
which went to trial. Anderson, DNA Evidence Questioned, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 18, 19.
Perhaps Cellmark's most highly visible paternity test was that involving the Mayor of Detroit,
Coleman Young. See Test Points to Detroit Mayor As Boy's Dad, Chi. Tribune, May 13, 1989,
at 4, col. 3.
10. According to a recent study, as of January 1990, forensic DNA evidence had been
introduced in at least 185 cases by 38 states and the U.S. military. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 14 (OTA-
BA-438 July 1990) [hereinafter GENETIC WITNESS]. The Office of Technology Assessment
study includes an appendix summarizing each of these cases. Id. at 157-72.
Lifecodes Corporation (Lifecodes) reports that its DNA test, "DNA-Print," has been admit-
ted in 95 criminal cases in the United States. In all but two cases, Lifecodes was asked to
testify for the prosecution. In only one case, People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985 (Sup. Ct. 1989), has the Lifecodes evidence been held inadmissible to link the defendant to
the crime scene. In another case, Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990), part
of the Lifecodes test, relating to its calculation of statistical probabilities, was excluded.
Lifecodes has run approximately 5,000 such tests. Telephone interview with Karen Wexler,
Public Relations Associate of Lifecodes (Jan. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Wexler interview].
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as a "powerful tool to help solve violent crimes,"'" its place in the criminal
justice system is not yet assured. 12  Commentators have noted repeatedly
that the sophistication of the technique and the attendant difficulty in judg-
ing its reliability present a unique challenge to the courts. 3 Despite con-
cerns with the technique's reliability, no criminal or civil court, until
recently, has held the evidence inadmissible to prove identity. 4
Celmark Diagnostics (Cellmark) reports that it has been called to testify regarding its DNA
Fingerprint test in 55 criminal proceedings in 21 states. In all but one case, State v. Schwartz,
447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989), the evidence was admitted. In State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d
513, 519 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) and Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, -, 565 N.E.2d
440, 445 (1991), Cellmark's statistical data was excluded. Since the laboratory began opera-
tions in 1987, it has performed thousands of tests for criminal hearings. Telephone interview
with Mark D. Stolorow, Manager, Forensic Science, Cellmark Diagnostics (Jan. 17, 1990)
[hereinafter Stolorow interview].
Forensic Science Associates (F.S.A.) amplityped 200 forensic DNA samples in 1988. The
amplitype test has been admitted in several cases in the United States, including Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 98, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 281 (1990). In
California v. Martinez, No. A 709321 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1988), the test results were held
inadmissible for failing to be generally accepted in the field of forensic science. Telephone
interview with Jennifer Mihalovich of F.S.A. (Jan. 17, 1990) [hereinafter Mihalovich inter-
view]; see also Levy, DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases: Legal Developments, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25,
1990, at 1.
The F.B.I.'s DNA fingerprinting test was recently examined and admitted in United States
v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990).
The disparity between the number of samples typed and the number of cases where the
prosecution has introduced the evidence can be explained by a number of scenarios. First, the
test results may yield no result, known as a "noncall." Wexler interview, supra. For example,
a noncall may result when the DNA is of insufficient molecular weight to perform the experi-
ment accurately or where the DNA is too degraded to produce a result. Second, the test may
result in an exclusion when the DNA typing reveals that the suspect's DNA is of a different
origin than that of the unknown or victim's sample. Lifecodes records an exclusion rate of
25%. Id. Third, the test results may not be introduced as a result of plea agreements. Faced
with the test results, the suspect may admit guilt, obviating the need for a proceeding to deter-
mine the admissibility of the particular DNA evidence.
11. Hicks, DNA Tests Proves Itself in Solving Crimes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1990, at A24,
col. 4 (letter to the Editor). John W. Hicks is the Assistant Director of the Laboratory Divi-
sion at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hicks's letter was written in response to an earlier
article, Kolate, Some Scientists Doubt the Value of "Genetic Fingerprint" Evidence, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
12. See Baird, Neufeld & Scheck, DNA Testing: Is Forensic DNA Testing Reliable?,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 34; Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific
Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990) [hereinafter The Dark
Side]; Thompson, Case Not Yet Closed on Forensic Use of DNA, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1991, at
A3, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Comment, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 665, 670-76 (1989) [hereinafter The Unexamined Witness]; The Dark Side,
supra note 12, at 495-526.
14. For cases where DNA evidence was excluded or limited, see generally United States v.
Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (excluded); State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1989) (limited); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990) (same); Common-
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The first serious confrontation between the proponents and skeptics of
DNA typing occurred in People v. Castro. 5 Castro involved a long and unu-
sual preliminary hearing in which the Supreme Court of Bronx County, New
York, held that a particular set of DNA identification tests, ordered by the
prosecution in an effort to link the defendant with the crime scene, were
inadmissible as a matter of law. 16
This Comment examines Castro and its potential effects on both future
litigation and legislative action. In Part I, this Comment addresses the ad-
missibility issues associated with DNA evidence. To facilitate discussion of
these issues, Part II explains the science of DNA fingerprinting. Part III
provides a detailed explanation of the Castro case, focusing on specific labo-
ratory procedures assailed by the court. Part IV discusses the Castro court's
three-pronged recommendation for future preliminary hearings on DNA ev-
idence. In Part V, this Comment explores the legislative response to the
technology in light of Castro. Part VI demonstrates the need to create stan-
dards governing DNA fingerprinting procedures. Finally, this Comment
concludes that Castro-in holding the prior standard developed in Frye v.
United States 17 poorly suited to the complexities of the DNA procedure-
offers a sound analytical approach to all courts considering the introduction
of forensic DNA evidence.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF NOVEL SCIENTIFIC TECHNIQUES
Like all evidence produced through novel scientific techniques, DNA evi-
dence must satisfy preliminary considerations of admissibility.18 Courts use
wealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991) (reversing admission of DNA evi-
dence and remanding for determination on general acceptance of statistical data); State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989) (excluded); People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545
N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (same). For cases where the evidence was admitted, see gener-
ally United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d
841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989); Cobey v. State, 80
Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643
(Sup. Ct. 1988), affid sub nom. People v. Bailey, 156 A.D.2d 846, 549 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 810, 551 N.E.2d 1238, 552 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y.
1990); State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990); State v. Ford, - S.C. -, 392
S.E.2d 781 (1990); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Spencer v. Common-
wealth cases, discussed infra at note 162; State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
15. 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
16. Id. at 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye held that to be admissible, a novel scientific tech-
nique "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
18. For an excellent treatment of the admissibility rules, see generally Giannelli, The Ad-
missibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 1197 (1980).
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two distinct approaches to determine the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence.
The majority of jurisdictions has adopted the approach set forth in the
1923 case of Frye v. United States.19 When considering the admissibility of
any evidence produced through new scientific procedures, a Frye jurisdiction
requires that the procedures gain "general acceptance" within the appropri-
ate scientific community. 20 Attacks upon DNA typing usually focus on the
"general acceptance" portion of the Frye test. However, because this tech-
nique finds its roots in molecular biology, chemistry, and population genet-
ics, a court may have difficulty determining the appropriate scientific field
before reaching the "general acceptance" question.21
Jurisdictions that do not adopt the Frye test apply a general "relevancy"
test reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence.22 Under the federal rules,
scientific evidence is treated as expert testimony; admissibility is conditioned
on the qualification of the expert and the probative value of the evidence.23
Specifically, when determining the admissibility of novel scientific techniques
under the relevancy approach, Giannelli and Imwinkelried have suggested
that courts apply a three-step analysis. 24 First, to assess the probative value
of the evidence, courts must consider the reliability of the scientific evi-
dence,25 since probative value is concerned with assessing whether the prof-
fered evidence has a tendency to make a fact of consequence "more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.",26 Next, the court
should identify any "countervailing dangers" that may accompany introduc-
tion of the evidence. 27 Lastly, the court must weigh the probative value of
the evidence against any identified dangers, excluding the evidence only
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
21. For a discussion of DNA typing and its admissibility under Frye, see Thompson &
Ford, supra note 4, at 52-63. For a discussion of the acceptance of the technique under both
Frye and the "relevancy" test, see Identification Tests, supra note 5, at 932-54; The Unexam-
ined Witness, supra note 13, at 682-94.
22. Federal Rules 401, 402, and 702 seem to indicate that any relevant scientific evi-
dence or testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact and is not prejudicial,
misleading, or overly time-consuming. However, neither the Federal Rules, nor their
official commentaries, mention the Frye doctrine, leaving it unsettled whether the
general acceptance standard had been replaced. Courts and legal scholars conflict on
this issue.
The Unexamined Witness, supra note 13, at 686 n.101 (citation omitted); see also J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702-34 (1990).
23. FED. R. EVID. 702.
24. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-6.
25. Id. at § 1-6(A).
26. FED. R. EVID. 401.
27. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-6(B).
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when its probative value is substantially outweighed by "unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, or [potential to] misleadj the jury."2
It is possible to identify some countervailing dangers that courts, under
both Frye and the federal rules, must address before submitting DNA evi-
dence to the jury. Not only is any detailed explanation of scientific proce-
dure apt to confuse a jury,2 9 but also the popular designation of the
28. FED. R. EvID. 403. In the context of DNA identification, at least one court has found
the Frye approach superior to that advanced by the federal rules. In State v. Schwartz, 447
N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989), attorneys for the state urged rejection of both Frye and State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), the latter adding to Frye the requirement that experts in
the field "generally agree that the evidence is reliable and trustworthy." Schwartz, 447
N.W.2d at 424. The State urged adoption of the federal rules' tests to consider the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence in the murder trial of Thomas Robert Schwartz. After considering Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 401, 402 & 403, which are substantially identical to their
federal counterparts, the court declined:
The state urges rejection of the Frye standard and adoption of an approach that
would treat novel scientific evidence like other expert opinion evidence, admitting it
if: a) it assists the trier of fact and there is a reasonable basis for it MINN. R. EVID.
702 and 703; b) it is relevant under rules 401 and 402; and c) the probative value is
not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, rule 403. To be admissible, rele-
vant and reliable emerging scientific evidence need not necessarily have first passed
muster within its appropriate scientific field, as required by Frye's general acceptance
prong. Without this safeguard, we believe an undesired element of subjectivity is
possible in evidentiary rulings under the relevancy approach. The Frye standard, on
the other hand, facilitates more objective and uniform rulings.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 424 (citations omitted).
In United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D. Vt. 1990), the district court followed
the relevancy test of United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1978), which rejected Frye. Quoting Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198, the Jakobetz court
reasoned that the relevancy test was better than Frye's general acceptance standard:
Unanimity of opinion in the scientific community, on virtually any scientific ques-
tion, is extremely rare. Only slightly less rare is a strong majority. Doubtless, a
technique unable to garner any support, or only minuscule support, within the scien-
tific community would be found unreliable by a court. In testing for admissibility of
particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting' pattern may be,
the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibility for determin-
ing the reliability of that evidence.
Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 254. The Jakobetz court articulated 14 factors to its relevancy test,
see 747 F. Supp. at 254-55, and concluded that "[t]he essential question is not whether the
technique is infallible, but rather whether the scientific technique exhibits 'a level of reliability
sufficient to warrant its use in the courtroom.'" 747 F. Supp. at 255 (quoting Williams, 583
F.2d at 1198).
29. In a recent murder trial in Long Island, New York, DNA evidence was introduced by
the prosecution to link the defendant to the murder scene. The prosecution called a laboratory
technician, Lorah McNally of Lifecodes Corporation, to explain the technique to the jury.
The testimony produced the following effect: "As Ms. McNally went through her testimony,
dry, technical and frequently repetitive under cross-examination, some members of the jury
seemed to have trouble paying attention. If they were not dozing, several did have their eyes
closed." Lyall, DNA Tests Link Golub To Killing, Expert Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1990, at
B4, col. 4.
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technique as "DNA fingerprinting" may confer an unwarranted connotation
of the technique's accuracy. a Furthermore, the statistical frequency data31
accompanying DNA evidence may increase the risk of unfair prejudice or
confusion contemplated by the federal rules.3 2 Although the impact of pow-
erful frequency statistics on a particular court's balancing of probative value
and prejudicial concerns remains unsettled, the distinctive character of this
aspect of DNA fingerprinting presents a unique issue to the legal system; in
the face of powerful statistical data, the threshold question of admissibility
may be determinative of guilt.33
Whichever test is used, Frye or the relevancy test,34 the admissibility of
30. "[T]he word fingerprinting tends to suggest erroneously that DNA testing... will
identify conclusively, like real fingerprinting, the one person in the world who could have left
the identifying evidence at the crime scene." Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, -,
565 N.E.2d 440, 441 n.2 (1991).
31. In declaring a match between any given piece of typed trace evidence and the suspect,
the DNA propounder will state that the chance of such a match occurring at random is statis-
tically minute. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
32. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury .... "
33. Because DNA evidence is so new and the resulting prejudice to the defendant is
sufficiently great, it is imperative that the court satisfy itself that there exists a suffi-
cient foundational basis as to the overall admissibility of the evidence. This must be
done before the government exposes the jury to the lab results. If the court has
explored only scientific acceptability and the reliability of acceptable testing proce-
dures in camera, and then, at trial the government fails to show that the lab tests did
conform to reliable procedures, the court would have to exclude the evidence for lack
of foundation. In doing so, the resulting prejudice to the defendant would be obvi-
ous. Notwithstanding the fact that an objection is sustained and the evidence ex-
cluded, aside from valuable trial time wasted, the jury would be exposed to
prejudicial proofs and left to speculate as to why the defendant opposed the ultimate
result.
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990).
[Until] [t]he judge has considered the admissibility of the results of the DNA testing
during a pretrial hearing.., a jury should not be given the evidence and allowed to
determine the validity and soundness of the process because evidence of this charac-
ter has too great a potential for affecting a jury's judgment.
Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, -, 565 N.E.2d 440, 442 n.7 (1991). "When an
expert comes in and says there's a one in 700 million chance that your man is not the one-and
you know he's one of only 30 million black men in the country-it just kills you. It intimidates
the jury." Taylor, From One Speck, A Case Is Made, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 3, 22, ol. 1.
But see United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 263 (D. Vt. 1990):
The court does not believe that a jury will be awed into complete submission by
DNA profile technology. To the extent a jury will be impressed, however, the [prose-
cution] has sufficiently established that the current reliability and accuracy of DNA
profiling justifies an aura of amazement. That DNA profiling is a remarkable ad-
vancement in forensic science, however, does not preclude it from being presented to
a jury.
34. See generally United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding Frye
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DNA typing as a novel scientific technique will remain a contentious issue.
Until there is a consensus among the courts and commentators that stan-
dards exist to safeguard against admission of unreliable test results, Castro's
questions on the reliability of individual laboratory procedures should con-
tinue to challenge the admissibility of the technique, ensuring that no DNA
evidence is admitted prematurely.
II. THE TECHNIQUE FROM CRIME SCENE TO TEST RESULTS
The DNA typing procedure begins with, forensic evidence. Blood stains,
hair, skin tissue, and semen, or other bodily fluids may be recovered from
the crime scene by common forensic procedures and then used to link a
suspect to the crime.35 After the biological matter is removed from the
crime scene-for example, blood from stained clothing-the resulting "sam-
ple" is sent to a laboratory for DNA testing.36 Currently, laboratories use
and relevancy test compatible); United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990)
(applying relevancy test); State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (same); An-
drews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (applying relevancy test but stating
that DNA evidence would still be admissible under Frye), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.
1989); Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 393 S.E.2d 436 (1990) (applying relevancy test); Cobey
v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989) (applying Frye); Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409
Mass. 218, 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991) (applying Frye); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn.
1989) (applying modified Frye); People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup.
Ct. 1989) (applying Frye); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (same), afid sub noma. People v. Bailey, 156 A.D.2d 846, 549 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 810, 551 N.E.2d 1238, 552 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. 1990);
State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990) (applying modified Frye); State v.
Ford, - S.C. -, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990) (applying modified Frye); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d
579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (applying Frye); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d
775 (applying relevancy test but stating that DNA evidence would still be admissible under
Frye), reaffirmed en banc, 283 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759
(1990); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989) (applying Frye).
35. DNA tests may be performed only on sample cells that contain DNA. Mature red
blood cells do not carry nucleic DNA. Likewise, urine and fecal matter are untestable because
of the absence of DNA. White blood cells and other parts of the blood do, however, contain
nucleic DNA. See Identification Tests, supra note 5, at 909 n.27.
While DNA typing could well revoiutionize identification procedures, investigators may re-
gard the technique as a mere gratuity. Police detectives must still generate, then narrow, a -list
of suspects, more-often-than-not the most taxing of all police functions. The Colin Pitchfork
case stands as the rare exception. The police investigating the Pitchfork murders requested
that all men in the surrounding geographic area between the ages of 13 and 30 submit blood
samples for DNA testing in an attempt to identify the murderer of two local women. With the
cooperation of the male population of an entire village, all but two men, of an estimated 5,500,
submitted to the request. Colin Pitchfork was arrested after a friend admitted to submitting
blood under Pitchfork's name. Note, DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J.
474, 474 [hereinafter New Investigatory Tool]. See generally J. WAMBAUGH, supra note 5.
36. At present, six organizations in the United States perform the DNA typing procedure.
Of these organizations, five are private companies: Cellmark Diagnostics, 20271 Goldenrod
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two different methods of DNA typing to analyze forensic samples.37
Cellmark Diagnostics, Lifecodes Corporation, and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation use restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis (RFLP).
RFLP was used in Castro and therefore it is described in some detail below.
The second approach is reflected in tests performed by Forensic Science As-
sociates, using a product of Cetus Corporation. The Cetus test involves a
technique known as "amplityping" and is discussed briefly below.
3 8
A. DNA Typing and Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
1. Background: DNA and Polymorphic Sites
The human body is comprised of cells. Each cell is made up of forty-six
chromosomes, twenty-three inherited from the subject's mother and twenty-
three from the father. 39 Chromosomes are comprised of material called de-
oxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which is a chemical structure containing four
building blocks known as bases or nucleotides.' Scientists refer to these
bases by their initial letters A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cytosine), and T
(thymine).4 1 The order of these bases, throughout the DNA chain, ulti-
mately determines the individual characteristics of every person. Except for
identical twins, each person's DNA is unique and does not vary from cell to
cell. Likewise, in the absence of a rare mutation, a person's DNA is immu-
Lane, Germantown, Maryland 20874, (301) 428-4980 & 1-800-USA-LABS; Lifecodes Corp.,
Saw Mill River Road, Valhalla, New York 10595, (914) 784-2600 & 1-800-LIFECOD; Foren-
sic Science Associates (using a product of the Cetus Corporation), 3053 Research Drive, Rich-.
mond, California 94806, (415) 222-8883; Genescreen Inc., 2600 Stemmons Freeway, Suite 133,
Dallas, Texas 75207, (214) 631-8152 & 1-800-362-8378; and Gennan Corp., 475 North How-
ard Street, Room 475, Akron, Ohio 44310, (216) 535-3200 & 1-800-262-9191. The sixth or-
ganization is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Forensic Science Research and Training
Center, Quantico, Virginia 22135, (703) 640-6131.
37. Forensic DNA typing is broken into two different approaches: RFLP analysis and the
Cetus technique. Significant distinctions do, however, exist within any laboratory practice of
RFLP. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 48-49. The criticism of Lifecodes' form of
RFLP analysis may be imputed to some extent to other labs using a similar procedure. This
cannot be said of the Cetus technique, which-while it has its own limitations-is manifestly
different from RFLP. The repercussions of Castro, however, may erroneously cast suspicions
on all DNA identification techniques. This is the fear of Forensic Science Associates, the only
lab to employ the Cetus product. Mihalovich interview, supra note 10.
38. This Comment focuses on the RFLP analysis, infra at text accompanying notes 51-72,
but outlines the Cetus technique to demonstrate the dissimilarity of the two DNA procedures.
See infra text accompanying notes 73-80. The distinction is required to avoid an aggregate
treatment of DNA fingerprinting because the procedures differ significantly. Moreover, the
judicial acceptance of one technique does not obviate the need for a court or legislature to
scrutinize the other. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
39. J. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING 8 (1990).
40. Id.
41. Id.; Identification Tests, supra note 5, at 909-10.
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table. Thus, a cell recovered from one part of a person will contain a DNA
structure identical to that found in any other part of the same body, but
different from any DNA structure found in somebody else.42 The structure
of DNA is most frequently referred to as a "double helix," best imagined as
a long ladder twisted along its vertical axis.43 The rungs of the ladder de-
scribe bonds between bases. According to the "base-pair rule," each base
will bond only with its complement.' Therefore, an A base will only bond
with a T base and a C base will only bond with a G base. A person's "ge-
netic code" is determined by the sequencing of these base-pairs along the
DNA ladder. The code carries the information required for production of
the many proteins that make up the human body.
A portion of DNA that determines hereditary traits is called a gene.45
Each gene is located at a specific site, or locus, upon a specific chromosome.
Most sections (ninety-nine percent) of the DNA ladder are nonpolymorphic,
meaning that they vary little from one individual to another.16 There are,
however, certain loci that vary significantly from person to person. These
sites are called polymorphic, and contain the small variations in the order of
the bases that are responsible for the differences in individual human be-
ings.47 All genes may have two or more different versions called alleles.48
On polymorphic genes, these sites allow the individual to be recognized
through DNA typing; by examining sites for a certain polymorphic se-
quence, scientists can discriminate between two persons' DNA.4 9 The likeli-
hood that two individuals share identical polymorphic genes is extremely
rare and can be estimated through population genetics.5°
2. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
To begin the RFLP procedure,5 technicians extract DNA from the foren-
42. J. KIRBY, supra note 39, at 1.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 62.
45. J. WATSON, N. HOPKINS, J. ROBERTS, J. STEITZ & A. WEINER, MOLECULAR BIOL-
OGY OF THE GENE 9 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE].
46. For example, a nonpolymorphic site may consist of the DNA sequence for eyes,
hands, the head, or other characteristics shared by all Homo sapiens. Thompson & Ford,
supra note 4, at 62 n.79.
47. For example, the genes responsible for producing the proteins and antigens in blood
are polymorphic, hence, the existence of different blood types. J. KIRBY, supra note 39, at 25.
48. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE, supra note 45, at 12.
49. J. KIRBY, supra note 39, at 26.
50. Id. at 149.
51. For a detailed overview of the RFLP process, see Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at
64-76; see also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 94-97 (Supp. 1990); Burk,
DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 455, 458-
63 (1988); Kelly, Rankin & Wink, Method and Applications of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide
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sic sample through treatment with chemicals and enzymes.-s In order to
identify the polymorphic regions, restriction enzymes are introduced into the
DNA through a process known as "digestion" or "restriction digestion."5 3
The restriction enzymes recognize certain base-pair sequences and cut the
DNA at those points, called "restriction sites." The restriction enzymes will
cut any two nonpolymorphic sequences at the same point, producing DNA
fragments of identical length. If the restriction enzyme encounters a
polymorphic sequence, because of the base-pair arrangement, the fragment
produced by the cutting action of the enzyme will be of a different length.
The resultant fragment, cut at the polymorphic sequence, is known as a "re-
striction fragment length polymorphism," or RFLP.5 4
The DNA fragments are then lined up according to length to allow mea-
surement and comparison by a process called "gel electrophoresis."" The
RFLP's are placed on one end of an agarose gel with a positively charged
field on the other end. Because the DNA molecule carries a negative charge,
the fragments are attracted to the positive charge and will move through the
gel toward the opposite end. How far the fragments travel is a function of
size. The larger fragments will become mired at the top end of the gel while
the shorter RFLP's will progress further towards the positively charged low
end. Once the process is complete, the gel is stained and photographed both
to ensure that the emerged pattern is recorded 6 and to confirm that all the
DNA has been removed from the gel when the DNA is transferred to a
stable membrane.5 7
for the Non-Scientist, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 105, 105-08 (1987); New Investigatory Tool, supra
note 35, at 477-80; Identification Tests, supra note 5, at 911-16. See generally J. KIRBY, supra
note 39 (comprehensive and detailed examination of the science and issues of DNA finger-
printing). For a description of the process found within reported cases, see United States v.
Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 251-54 (D. Vt. 1990); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 847-48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989); Caldwell v. State, 260
Ga. 278, -, 343 S.E.2d 436, 437-41 (1990); Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 36-43, 559 A.2d
391, 393-98 (1989); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 314-17, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645-50
(Sup. Ct. 1988), afl'd sub nom. People v. Bailey, 156 A.D.2d 846, 549 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 810, 551 N.E.2d 1238, 552 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y.
1990).
52. In order to type the sample, a sufficient quantity of DNA must be present on the
specimen. Also, the suspect's DNA may need to be separated from other biological matter or
contaminants contained in the sample. A clean DNA sample is the first hurdle for any suc-
cessful DNA typing. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 65-67.
53. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 965, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 990-91 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
54. While not at issue in Castro, the process and use of restriction enzymes is itself not an
infallible technique. At least 37 possible problems may result from an abnormality in the
procedure. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 68 n.107.
55. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 966, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
56. Id.
57. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 71 n. 120.
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Before the DNA is transferred to the membrane for the purpose of pre-
serving and identifying the RFLP's, the fragments are treated with denatur-
ing chemicals which split the DNA ladder down the center. When split into
two strands containing complementary base-pair sequences, the strands are
permanently fixed on the membrane through a process known as "Southern
blotting" or "Southern transfer."5 8
Technicians next subject the DNA, present on the membrane, to the pro-
cess of "hybridization" in order to identify the polymorphic sites.59 The
membrane is placed into a solution containing a genetic probe or set of ge-
netic probes." The probes are treated with a radioactive substance which
allows subsequent recordation by use of X-ray film. Each probe contains a
specific polymorphic sequence that will seek out and attach to a single strand
of complementary DNA at a specific locus, ignoring the greater number of
nonpolymorphic sequences.1 Thus, the radioactive probe effectively high-
lights the polymorphic sequence. The X-ray, recording the positions of the
probes, is known as an "autoradiograph" or "autorad."6 2 Polymorphic seg-
ments appear on an autorad as bands or dark lines.6" The location of the
band on the membrane indicates how far the RFLP traveled in the gel. The
distance traveled, in turn, reflects the size of the polymorphic fragment.
Technicians express fragment length using a measure called a kilobase or
"kb," defined as the length of a DNA sequence of 1000 base-pair units.
Because the base-pair sequence within each probe is known, the length of
the fragments uniquely identifies the sample, allowing comparison with
other samples using the distinctive bands appearing on each autorad. In
criminal cases, Cellmark and Lifecodes use a single locus probe designed to
recognize a specific polymorphic sequence. The single locus probe will usu-
58. Southern blotting is named after Dr. Edward H. Southern, who first reported the
process in 1975. Id. at 71 n.119; Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 39, 559 A.2d 391, 395
(1989).
59. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 966-67, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991-92 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
60. Introduction of more than one genetic probe into the membrane is referred to as cock-
tail hybridization. See 144 Misc. 2d at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
61. At this point, finding the key polymorphic segments among all the other DNA
segments on the blot is like finding a needle in a haystack. One way to find the needle
would be to spread out the hay and pass a magnet over it. Similarly, in RFLP analy-
sis, the DNA is spread out by electrophoresis and a genetic probe acts as a "biologi-
cal magnet." The probe will lock onto the key polymorphic segments, but will not
lock onto all the other "hay" DNA in the sample.
Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 71 (footnote omitted).
62. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 967, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
63. For each series of hybridizations, the autorad may show a number of bands. The
presence of several bands on the autorad will appear as dark lines, irregularly spaced and
separated from each other, against a light, neutral-colored background. The effect has been
likened to the appearance of a UPC code found on most products in the local grocery store.
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ally produce two characteristic bands. 64 To generate high probabilities, mul-
tiple probes are usually run on the same membrane, either separately 65 or
together.66
When seeking to match the DNA of two individuals, the DNA of each
individual is placed in one of two "lanes" which appear on the autorad, thus
permitting side-by-side comparison. For example, DNA of a known origin,
such as that taken from the victim, is run alongside DNA of an unknown
origin (e.g., DNA recovered from the blood-stained shirt of the suspect).
The separate lanes contain a number of bands that will be examined to see if
the fragments highlighted by the probe are of the same length. If the posi-
tion of the bands appears to indicate that the fragments are the same size,
the bands are said to "co-migrate."' 67 In order to declare a "match," that is,
to declare that the bands represent similar polymorphic fragment lengths,
the lab must make a detailed examination and interpretation of the autorad.
First, the laboratory will visually examine the autorad to determine if the
bands in separate lanes co-migrate or line up. This initial "eye-balling" step
appears to be standard procedure in the laboratories practicing RFLP.68
Next, the autorad may be examined by a computer-digitizing instrument or
a video/computer apparatus that measures the length of the separate bands
in order to obtain a more precise objective measurement, ultimately provid-
ing the scientist with the necessary basis to verify that the two samples
match.69
64. The bands mark two different alleles, one inherited from the father and one from the
mother. If the mother and father have the same blood type, and thus share identical alleles,
the result will appear as a single band because the alleles overlap. Thompson & Ford, supra
note 4, at 72 & n.125 and accompanying text. This overlapping condition is referred to as a
homozygous match. See MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE, supra note 45, at 10. In con-
trast to the single locus probe, laboratories may also use a multi locus probe, which seeks out a
greater number of polymorphic sites, producing approximately 15 interpretable bands. GIAN-
NELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 17-8 (Supp. 1990). Use of multi locus probes
requires a relatively large sample of DNA. Id. Since the resulting number of bands is greater
than single locus RFLP, the autorads are somewhat harder to interpret. Id.
65. The membrane can be re-hybridized with another probe. After one probe has been
run, the excess solution is chemically washed and the process repeated with the new probe.
People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 967, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
66. See supra note 60.
67. See Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 967, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
68. Lifecodes' visual identification technique was criticized in Castro. See infra text ac-
companying notes 129-30. Lifecodes still employs the visual method as a first step, though it
has computer-digitizing and video equipment. Wexler interview, supra note 10. Cellmark also
uses both visual and computer-assisted techniques for sizing the bands. Stolorow interview,
supra note 10.
69. Even the use of the computer-digitizing and video equipment presents problems.
These objective measuring tools are often unable to identify the fragment length precisely, due
to external variables that may cause a distorted reading of the bands. The computer and video
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Once a match has been declared, the laboratory consults a population data
bank to estimate the frequency with which the specific allele would occur at
random within a particular sub-group of the population. 70  In some in-
stances, laboratories have assigned samples a statistical probability of ran-
dom occurrence at one in 700,000,000.71 In these cases, the practical effect
of admitting DNA evidence is to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that
there is no chance a sample found at a crime scene belonged to someone
other than the defendant.' 2
B. DNA Typing and "Amplityping"
Forensic Science Associates (F.S.A.) uses a DNA fingerprinting technique
known as "amplityping," a product of Cetus Corporation. The difference
between the Cetus procedure and RFLP is that the sample size required for
the former need be only a fraction of that required for RFLP analysis.' 3 The
Cetus technique permits rapid amplification of the targeted sequence of
DNA through a procedure known as polymerase chain reaction (PCR).74
The PCR method amplifies a single strand of denatured DNA, thereby pro-
ducing multiple copies of the original DNA sequence.' 5 The major advan-
equipment may also be unable to account for band "shifts"-variations in positions of bands
within a single lane. Moreover, both mechanisms still require "operator intervention"-a
technician running the digitizing instrument over the band or directing the video equipment-
and therefore human error will never be completely eliminated until the technology advances.
Wexler interview, supra note 10.
70. In order for the alleles to occur at random within a sub-group, and thus to declare
accurately the statistical probability of the non-random nature of the match, two preconditions
must be met. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 968, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 992. First, the occurrence of a
given polymorphic allele must not be caused by linkage disequilibrium, thus assuring that the
alleles were passed randomly to the subject. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 85. Secondly,
the relevant sub-group of the population must be in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. To ascer-,
tain whether the sub-group is in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, the scientist will consult a data
base to ensure that the occurrence of the allele in the sub-group is random. The Hardy-Wein-
berg principle is valid only where there is random mating in the population and no inbreeding.
State v. Caldwell, 260 Ga. 278, -, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443 n.6 (1990); see also J. KIRBY, supra
note 39, at 149-77 (explaining probability and statistical analysis).
71. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 301, 384 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990).
72. Id. at 315, 384 S.E.2d at 797.
73. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 17-8 (Supp. 1990).
74. For a detailed examination of the PCR technique, see generally Marx, Multiplying
Genes by Leaps and Bounds, 240 Sci. 1408 (1988); Higuchi, Von Beroldingen, Sensabaugh &
Erlich, DNA Typing from Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988). For a brief overview of the
Cetus test, see GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 97-101 (Supp. 1990) (illustra-
tions included); Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 76-78. For an explanation of PCR analy-
sis in a reported case, see Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 95-98, 393 S.E.2d 609, 620-
21, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 281 (1990).
75. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 17-8 (Supp. 1990). The sequence of
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tage of the PCR technique is that it enables a laboratory to test samples that
would be too small for RFLP. The Cetus test, however, is relatively suscep-
tible to misidentification if the sample is cross-contaminated with the DNA
from another individual;76 the amplification involved in the Cetus method
may amplify not only the targeted DNA sequence, but also any contamina-
tion that may exist on the sample. Another disadvantage of the Cetus proce-
dure is that because of the relatively small sample size analyzed, the
technique cannot generate the high probabilities of RFLP.77
Using the Cetus product, F.S.A. ran approximately two hundred DNA
identification tests in 1988.78 In a California case, the court found the new
technique accepted in scientific fields, but not generally accepted in the spe-
cific field of forensic science.7 9 The test's results have also reportedly been
introduced in at least eight criminal cases, in Pennsylvania, Florida, Vir-
ginia, Texas, Kansas, and California."° The technique was admitted in all
but one case. Recently, in one of the Spencer v. Commonwealth cases, the
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the admission of the PCR method.81
III. PEOPLE V. CASTRO
The court in People v. Castro 8 2 exposed RFLP analysis to intense judicial
scrutiny. Prior to Castro, no reported case undertook a searching inquiry
into the shortcomings of RFLP analysis. In Castro, the defendant, Joseph
Castro, stood accused of two counts of murder in the second degree.8 3 In-
vestigators seized Castro's wristwatch and found, on the watch, a bloodstain
that Castro claimed was his own.84 The prosecution sent the watch to
Lifecodes Corporation for RFLP analysis and later sought to introduce the
results of the test at trial. The proffer of the Lifecodes report started, in the
words of presiding Judge Gerald Sheindlin, "the most comprehensive and
extensive legal examination of DNA forensic tests held to date in the United
States.",
8 5
the new DNA strands is dictated by the sequence of the original DNA sequence. Technicians
can produce a million copies of the original DNA strand by repeating the PCR cycle approxi-
mately 20 times. Id.
76. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 77.
77. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 17-8 (Supp. 1990).
78. Id.
79. California v. Martinez, No. A70931 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1988).
80. Mihalovich interview, supra note 10.
81. 240 Va. 78, 98, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621, cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 281 (1990). For a discus-
sion of the Spencer cases, see infra note 162.
82. 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
83. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
84. Id. at 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
85. Id. Noting that the technique had not passed appellate scrutiny in New York, the
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Applying the principles of Frye and those enunciated in the New York
case of People v. Middleton,8 6 the Supreme Court of Bronx County began a
preliminary hearing that would take over twelve weeks, producing a tran-
script of over five thousand pages.87 In the end, Judge Sheindlin held the
evidence inadmissible to prove that the DNA in the watch's bloodstain
matched the victim's (inclusion)."8 This ruling precluded the prosecution
from arguing that the DNA test results linked Castro to the crime scene.
However, after the court ruled that Lifecodes had failed to conduct the nec-
essary and scientifically accepted tests to prove inclusion, the prosecution
offered the Lifecodes report to refute Castro's claim that the blood on the
wristwatch was his own (exclusion). The court allowed the DNA evidence
to show exclusion,8 9 noting that the methods for determining exclusion-
less complex and more reliable than those used to show inclusion-were
generally accepted in the scientific community.9°
The Castro court employed a three-prong test to determine the admissibil-
ity of the DNA evidence. 9 ' The test allowed the court to exclude the tests
for the purposes of inclusion, even though Judge Sheindlin stated that the
theory and techniques behind DNA fingerprinting were generally accepted
under Frye. The court concluded that, when properly performed, "DNA
forensic identification tests to determine inclusions are reliable and meet the
Frye standard of admissibility." 92
Attorneys Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld led the defense of Joseph Cas-
tro. While their efforts are best chronicled elsewhere, 93 Scheck, Neufeld and
their lead expert, Dr. Eric Lander, were able to convince the court that the
Castro court cited to the introduction of DNA evidence in two New York criminal cases. Id. at
959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986 (citations omitted).
86. 54 N.Y.2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981).
87. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
88. Id. at 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
89. Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
90. Id. at 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The Castro court, however, made clear that future
criminal cases involving DNA evidence should involve a pre-trial hearing on the laboratory
procedures used in a given test. Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99. The court further
concluded:
[G]iven the complexity of the DNA multi-system identification tests and the power-
ful impact that they may have on a jury, passing muster under Frye alone is insuffi-
cient to place this type of evidence before a jury without a preliminary, critical
examination of the actual testing procedures performed in a particular case.
Id. at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (citation omitted).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
92. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
93. See Parloff, How Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up The DNA Experts, AM.
LAW., Dec. 1989, at 50 [hereinafter Parloffl.
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tests. should be limited in certain areas.9 4 The defense attack in Castro
spanned both the theoretical and procedural aspects of the Lifecodes test.
The harshest criticism, and the most devastating from the court's point of
view, centered on Lifecodes' laboratory techniques and protocol.9 5 The de-
fense brief filed in the Castro hearing was a step-by-step challenge to the
Lifecodes methodology. 96 In the Castro opinion, Judge Sheindlin accepted
many of the defense arguments, criticizing Lifecodes for, among other
things, its use of contaminated probes, the absence of laboratory controls,
and for the inconsistency between its method for declaring a match between
the samples and declaring a measured match in the population data base.
97
Ultimately, these deficiencies led the court to exclude the tests for purposes
of inclusion, despite general acceptance of the DNA typing process-in the-
ory-7under Frye.
94. While the defense faulted Lifecodes on a wide range of its techniques, only those rec-
ognized by the Castro court are discussed herein. Given the demanding nature of the subject
matter, the points of contention are expressed simply. Those wishing to delve further into the
specifics of the arguments, and matters not discussed here, should refer to the parties' memo-
randa. See Memorandum in Opposition to the Introduction of DNA Evidence (submitted to
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County, by Barry C. Scheck, Esq. and
Peter J; Neufeld, Esq. on behalf of Joseph Castro, defendant in People v. Castro), reprinted in
DNA: Frye Meets Future Shock-Are Trials of the Blood Moot? (prepared by Barry C.
Scheck for the ABA Criminal Justice, Family Law, Science & Technology Sections and the
Young Lawyers Division, Aug. 5, 1989) [hereinafter Memorandum].
95. See Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 974, 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996, 997-98. Among the most
unusual events that occurred in the Castro hearing was a disclaimer entered by the prosecu-
tion's experts near the end of the hearing. Disturbed by the evidence that had come to light
during the course of the hearing, Dr. Lander met with prosecution experts, Dr. Richard Rob-
erts and Carl Dobkin, to discuss the Lifecodes tests.
Roberts, prosecutor [Risa] Sugarman's first witness at the hearing, had testified for
the prosecution in a half-dozen other Frye hearings, most of them involving
Lifecodes tests. Roberts was so upset to discover from Lander's report that the com-
pany did not follow its published matching rule that he proposed a mini-summit
conference: a meeting of the experts who had testified in Castro to see whether, as
scientists, they could come to some consensus. ...
The experts concluded in a written statement that the tests performed by Lifecodes
in the Castro case "were not scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion
that the samples ... do or do not match."
Parloff, supra note 93, at 55, col. 3. Dr. Roberts also appeared in the Spencer v. Common-
wealth cases, where he "testified unequivocally that there was no disagreement in the scientific
community about the reliability of DNA print testing." Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va.
563, 570, 385 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990); see also infra note
162. Lifecodes says that of "the two prosecution experts who did attend the meeting, one has
since declared that he's sorry he ever signed the statement and the other stated that the evi-
dence was clearly a match." New York v. Castro Summary (undated document prepared
by Lifecodes Corporation) (available from Lifecodes Corp., Saw Mill Road, Valhalla, N.Y.
10595).
96. See Memorandum, supra note 94.
97. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 969-73, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994-98.
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A. Analysis and Use of Contaminated Probes
First, Scheck and Neufeld argued that Lifecodes failed to explain ade-
quately the presence of a 6kb band found, on autorad 17, in the lane of the
deceased but not in the watch band sample. In its formal report to the Dis-
trict Attorney on July 22, 1987,98 Lifecodes made no reference to this
band.99 At the hearing, however, all of the prosecution experts admitted to
seeing a band at 6kb.1°" Acknowledging the presence of the 6kb band,
Lifecodes attempted to account for the band by re-hybridizing the mem-
brane with other probes, in an effort to show that the band was non-
human.'' The re-hybridization produced conflicting results.'° 2 While the
court concluded that, because of the conflicting autorads, autorad 17 was
unreliable by itself, the jury was permitted to weigh its unreliability in con-
junction with the results of two other re-hybridized autorads that did not
indicate a band at 6kb. o3 The court, however, took a dim view of the reuse
of at least one contaminated probe during the additional hybridization, mak-
ing clear that Lifecodes' practice of reusing contaminated probes was "un-
scientific and unacceptable."'"
B. Analysis of Degraded DNA from the Watch and Use of
Nonpolymorphic Probes
Second, the defense argued that the DNA extracted from Castro's watch,
because of the DNA's apparent degradation, could not be adequately ana-
98. See Memorandum, supra note 94, at 37.
99. Id. at 36-37. An unexplained band on any autorad will threaten the reliability of the
test. Identifying whether the band is of human or non-human origin is essential because a
band of non-human origin could indicate that the sample is contaminated, undermining (or
possibly vitiating) the accuracy of the test results. Id. at 37.
100. Id. at 36.
101. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996; see also Memorandum, supra note
94, at 37-38. The results of the four probes were recorded on autorads 7, 8, 9, and 10. Castro,
144 Misc. 2d at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
102. Autorad 9, for detecting rDNA, showed no band at 6kb. Memorandum, supra note
94, at 37. Autorad 10, for detecting bluescribe plasmid, produced a useless result because of
either probe or control lane contamination. Id. at 974 n. 10, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996 n. 10. Finally,
autorads 2 and 4, utilizing nonsynthetic probes for D2S44 and D17S79, did not react with any
locus at 6kb, indicating that the observed band at 6kb was not part of either loci identified by
the D2S44 and D17S79 probes. Id. at 975, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996. A third re-hybridization took
place with a bacterial and bluescribe plasmid, yielding autorads 7 and 8, which did produce a
band at 6kb. The results reflected in 7 and 8 suggested that the band observed at 6 kb was
produced by a contaminant and was not human in origin. Id.
103. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 975, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
104. Id. at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997. The probes used in producing autorads 2 and 4 were
nonsynthetic. A nonsynthetic probe is subject to contamination and may bind to bacterial
DNA present on the membrane as well as human DNA. Id. at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994; see
also Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 503 (1989) [hereinafter Lander].
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lyzed. Degradation smears the DNA along the lane, producing a broad and
blurry print and potentially obscuring bands higher on the autorad.10 5 The
probe for D2S44 06 showed a homozygous band at about 10.25kb in the lane
of the deceased.° 7 The watch lane revealed a single band at roughly the
same spot. Thus, the sole band observed in the watch lane was declared a
homozygous match, i.e., the two samples shared a homozygous condition at
the D2S44 locus.
Recall that Castro claimed the blood was his own. Because of the de-
graded condition of the watch sample, Castro challenged the report's conclu-
sion that the blood on his watch matched that of the deceased. Defense
expert Dr. Eric Lander noted that the degradation would tend to obscure
higher bands. As such, the presence of a second band, indicating that the
sample was heterozygous, would go undetected."10 If the degradation were
severe, there would be no indication that alleles existed above 10.25kb, mak-
ing it impossible to determine whether the watch sample was heterozygous
at the D2S44 location.
Prosecution expert Dr. Michael Baird testified that it was possible to ex-
amine the extent of degradation by eye and that, in this case, there was
"some indication that there is enough material present to be able to get a
signal in the 12-15kb range.'"' ° 9 Dr. Lander responded that technicians
could more accurately assess the extent of degradation by using a more sen-
sitive test, a nonpolymorphic probe to detect signals above 15kb.'1 ° If loci
were detected above that range, it could render unreliable Lifecodes' asser-
tion as to the homozygous condition of the watch sample. The court agreed
105. See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 89 n.195, 93 & n.273 and accompa-
nying text; Memorandum, supra note 94, at 33-34.
106. The name of a particular probe indicates the specific locus to which the probe will
attach. The names represent the site of the locus on the genome designated by the Human
Gene Matching Conference. See Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, -, 393 S.E.2d 436, 439
(1990). Thus, D2S44 indicates a particular site on the distal arm of the second chromosome.
107. Because people inherit one chromosome from each of their parents, alleles at a partic-
ular locus may be the same size. If a particular allele from each parent matches, this condition
is called homozygous. When identifying a homozygous condition, the bands may overlap and
therefore be difficult to distinguish. If, however, the condition is heterozygous, the bands
would occur at different positions on the autorad because the fragments would be of different
length and thus would travel differently across the gel. A true homozygous condition would
indicate only one band which is actually two-overlapping bands. Telephone Interview with
Mark D. Stolorow, Manger, Forensic Science, Cellmark Diagnostics (Feb. 18, 1991); see also J.
KIRBY, supra note 39, at 8; MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE, supra note 45, at 10.
108. Lander, supra note 104, at 503.
109. Id.
110. Id.
19911
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that such a probe was needed 1 and suggested that in the case of D2S44,
Lifecodes technicians could have used a nonpolymorphic probe to detect loci
above 13kb.' 12 The conflicting expert testimony on the matter, however,
was sufficient to place the issue before the jury."1 3
Regarding the questions of contamination and degradation, the court
noted that preventive techniques, such as disposal of contaminated probes
and the use of nonpolymorphic probes for degraded samples, were scientifi-
cally accepted and should have been utilized to resolve the conflicting testi-
mony. 1 4 These are only two of the recommendations the court advanced in
an effort to solve the apparent procedural deficiencies in Lifecodes' practice.
C. Sex of the Watch Lane and the Need for Controls
The attorneys in Castro also questioned whether sufficient controls were
present to ensure accurate determination of the sex origin of the watch sam-
ple. If the blood from the watch was of male origin, then, by exclusion, it
could not have come from the female victim. Castro had claimed the blood
was his own. To resolve the gender question, Lifecodes subsequently con-
ducted an experiment to test the sex origin of the watch sample. Hybridiza-
tion with a probe for DYZ1 "' revealed the blood to be of female origin. To
determine whether hybridization occurs correctly, technicians normally pre-
111. Because the DNA on the watch was degraded, i.e. eaten by bacteria, some ques-
tion arises whether the blood DNA on the watch revealed a true homozygous band
or a heterozygous band which appears homozygous-because the upper band had
degraded away. Utilization of a non-polymorphic probe is essential in answering this
question.
Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 975, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
112. Id. at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
113. Id. at 975, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. Though the court does not mention it, Lander
reported Lifecodes' attempts to explain the 'apparent degradation after the issuance of their
final report:
To rebut the problem with degradation above 10 kb, Lifecodes probed the Southern
blot with the human Alu repeat sequence and determined that it showed hybridiza-
tion up to 23 kb molecular mass marker. In my opinion, the experiment itself was
meaningless (because the ability to detect a sequence repeated 300,000 times in the
genome has no bearing on the ability to detect single-copy sequences), but it was
unnecessary to explain this to the court. Defence [sic] attorney Peter Neufeld, by
now a veteran reader of autoradiograms, noticed that someone had accidentally mis-
read the size markers: the Alu hybridization actually extended only to the 9.8-kb
marker.
Lander, supra note 104, at 504.
114. See Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 996, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
115. The DYZI locus is estimated to repeat about 2,000 times on the distal arm of the Y
chromosome. Because the male sex chromosome (XY) contains the Y chromosome and the
female sex chromosome (XX) does not, hybridization of a male sex chromosome with the
probe for DYZI should reveal an intense band at 3.7kb. If the blood, has a female origin, no
band will appear. Lander, supra note 104, at 503.
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pare a control lane with the blood of a known sex type. Lifecodes' one con-
trol lane, allegedly known to contain a sample of female origin, yielded the
same pattern as the watch lane sample, thus indicating that both the blood
on the watch and the blood in the Lifecodes control lane were of female
origin.
The testimony of Dr. Baird and a Lifecodes technician, however, pro-
duced conflicting answers on the sexual origin of the blood in the control
lane.' 16 Dr. Lander testified that the experiment could not be reliably per-
formed without the presence of two controls, one to show a positive (male),
the other to show a negative (female). Apparently persuaded by Dr.
Lander's testimony, the court refused to admit the test.
117
D. Declaring a Match: Two Unexplained Bands in the Watch Lane
A third problem emerging from the Lifecodes' report was the declared
match between the observable bands in the watch lane and the bands in the
victim's lane."' The hybridization for locus DXYS 14 produced five bands
in the watch lane and only three bands in the victim's lane." 9 Three bands
shown in both lanes appeared to match. Lifecodes' Dr. Baird testified that
the two additional bands in the watch lane, designated "A" and "B," were of
nonhuman origin.
The court explained the implications of the presence of the additional
bands:
The existence of bands A and B are of critical importance in deter-
mining whether the forensic DNA testing performed in this case
demonstrates these bands to be human DNA or nonhuman DNA.
If bands A and B were of human origin then one would have to
conclude that the DNA in [the victim's lane] and the DNA in [the
watch lane] came from different sources. 120
Lifecodes reported that the extra bands were contaminants "of a non-human
116. Id. At one point in the hearing, Baird claimed the sample came from a female. Later,
the Lifecodes technician who performed the hybridization claimed the blood came from a male
scientist. Baird attempted to explain that the male scientist had an abnormal Y chromosome
which would not produce the usual band. Finally, Baird claimed that the control sample had
come from a female technician. In addition to contributing to the exclusion of this sex-deter-
mining experiment, the conflicting testimony "underscored the need for meticulous record-
keeping in DNA forensics, which may not originally have been as clear." Id.
117. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 975, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997. The court endorsed the more accu-
rate procedure: "In the absence of both controls, it is difficult to determine whether the probe
hybridized correctly. The failure to include both [the positive male, and negative female,]
controls renders the experiment uninterpretable." Id.
118. Id. at 976, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
119. Id.; Lander, supra note 104, at 502.
120. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 976, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
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origin that we have not been able to identify." 121 Their additional attempts
to identify the two suspect bands as nonhuman were unsuccessful. 122 Be-
cause of these defects at the DXYS14 locus, the court held that the evidence
was inconclusive and inadmissible as a matter of law to show a match be-
tween the victim's blood and the blood found on the watch. 123 The court
further believed that additional experiments might have discounted the two
additional bands as contaminants.124
E. Statistical Probabilities: Population Genetics and the Need for a
Uniform Matching Rule
The Castro defense team also assailed Lifecodes' use of population genet-
ics."' Although the court never reached the statistical frequency issue,
Judge Sheindlin did characterize Lifecodes' statistical procedures as
unacceptable. 126
The power of DNA typing lies not only in its ability to match samples, but
also in its ability to represent accurately the probability that a declared
match will occur at random in a specific population group. 127  The
121. Lander, supra note 104, at 502.
122. Id.
123. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 976-77, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98. Experts for both parties
agreed that the samples should have been re-hybridized to see if the two additional bands
reappeared. This was not done and both sides conceded that absent such tests, the evidence of
the three pairs of identical bands was inadmissible to declare a match. Even Dr. Howard
Cooke of the Medical Research Council in Edinburgh, the scientist who invented the probe
used to hybridize at DXYS14 and who provided the probe to Lifecodes, testified that the
unexplained bands had to exclude Castro. Lander, supra note 104, at 502.
Dr. Lander offered some insight on why Lifecodes deemphasized the extra two bands in the
watch lane:
Lifecodes' discounting of the two non-matching bands in the watch lane suggests that
its identification of bands may have been influenced by making direct comparisons
between lanes containing different DNA samples, rather than by considering each
lane in its own right....
The tendency to use lane-to-lane comparison to distinguish between [legitimate]
bands and [false indicators] is perfectly natural; such comparison can be quite helpful
in certain experiments. However, in my opinion, it is inappropriate in DNA finger-
printing analysis of unknown samples-as one runs the risk of discounting precisely
those differences that would exonerate an innocent defendant. Forensic laboratories
should be required to use objective criteria for identifying the bands in each lane, and
to use experiments to rule out proposed artefacts.
Lander, supra note 104, at 502. The Castro court culled this criticism of the Lifecodes match-
ing rule and proposed a standardized, objective procedure for declaring a match. Castro, 144
Misc. 2d at 978-79, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
124. Id. at 980, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
125. See Memorandum, supra note 94, at 35-43.
126. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
127. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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probability of error in either of these aspects influences the ultimate reliabil-
ity of the test's conclusions. In Castro, Lifecodes allowed a greater
probability of error in the sample matchings than in the random population
predictions, but focused on the accuracy of the latter, making the test results
appear more reliable than they were.' 28 ,
In order to ensure the accuracy of a declared match, a laboratory must
employ a method to determine whether bands that are similarly situated in
their respective lanes actually occur at the same position. In this case, to
ascertain the band's precise position, Lifecodes visually examined the band's
position and declared a match. The court found this method acceptable 129
only when technicians follow this estimate with an objective qualitative mea-
surement to ensure accuracy.' 3° Lifecodes' matching rules would declare a
match between two measured fragments if the difference in positions fell
within three standard deviations,' accounting for insignificant variations
between lanes.
After declaring a match between the samples, the laboratory next esti-
mates the probability of the match occurring at random in the population.
To make this estimation, the laboratory relies on data demonstrating the
frequency with which particular alleles occur in the select population group.
However, in order to represent accurately the statistical probability of the
match occurring at random, the laboratory must apply the same standard
deviation rule used in the fragment measurement to calculations of observed
frequency in the population data base.' 32 In Castro, the standard deviation
rule used to declare a match between two measured fragments was aban-
doned when the laboratory consulted the population data bank; Lifecodes
used a stricter calculation for examining deviations in the population
128. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 977 n.13, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998 n.15.
129. Contra Lander, supra note 104, at 502-03.
130. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998. Lifecodes employs a computer-
digitizing apparatus, considered to be extremely accurate, as an objective measuring tool. Id.;
Lander, supra note 104, at 502.
131. Lifecodes' standard deviation (s.d.) is reported to be a difference in position corre-
sponding to 0.6 of molecular weight. Based upon this observation, Lifecodes announced a
matching rule: two fragments are said to match if their band positions differ by less than 3
s.d.'s. This same matching rule was prescribed by Lifecodes for the samples in Castro. Thus, if
fragments appeared within the 3 s.d. range, they were considered indistinguishable, and their
average size reported. Lander, supra note 104, at 502. In Castro, however, the results pro-
duced from Lifecodes' computer-digitizing showed that the bands observed for D2S44 and
D17S79 differed in position greater than 3 s.d.'s, falling outside the declared rule, thus indicat-
ing a nonmatch. Id. To answer the seemingly self-contradictory result, Lifecodes stated that
the objective, computer-digitized measurements were not used to pronounce a match. Rather,
Lifecodes' decision was based solely upon a visual matching of the band positions. Id.
132. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 967-69, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
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group.' 33 Dr. Lander explained the practical effect of this inconsistency:
"[It would be] like catching a match with a 10-foot-wide butterfly net, but
then attempting to prove the difficulty of the feat by showing how hard it is
to catch matches with a 6-inch-wide butterfly net."1 34 The Castro court la-
beled this particular Lifecodes practice "dubious' 35 and declared that had
it admitted the underlying physical evidence to show a match, the statistical
probabilities formulated by Lifecodes "would [nonetheless] have been pre-
cluded or substantially reduced."1 36
F State of the Art: Recommended Laboratory Techniques
Much of the conflict in Castro revolved around the optimum techniques
and protocol for a DNA testing laboratory. Except where Lifecodes was
blatantly deficient in its testing procedures, placement of blame on Lifecodes
for the inadmissibility of the Castro DNA evidence might be unfair; when
the Castro tests were performed, the forensic RFLP technique was still in its
infancy and no detailed standards existed. Further, the migration of prose-
cution experts to the defense side in Castro demonstrates that the scientific
community, as a whole, was itself grappling with the need to formulate spe-
cific criteria to guarantee accurate test results. Faced with the lack of scien-
tific consensus and Lifecodes' flawed methodology, the, Castro court
nevertheless drew specific conclusions about the quality controls needed to
admit forensic DNA typing in subsequent Bronx County cases., 37
To ensure that technicians correctly declare a match between two frag-
133. When calculating the probability of a random match in the data base, the range of
acceptable results fell within 2/3 s.d.'s. Lander, supra note 104, at 504.
134. Id.
135. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 977 n.13, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998 n.15.
136. Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998. "[W]hatever standard of deviation that was used by
Lifecodes, it is clear that Lifecodes failed to use the same measurement in calculating the
frequency of the alleles in the population. As noted, this is scientifically unacceptable." Id. at
977 n.13, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998 n.15.
137. Id. at 969, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 993-95. The court explained that the techniques, devel-
oped in research laboratories where the nature of the testing and the testing environment per-
mit repeated experiments to ensure accuracy, must incorporate more exacting procedural
requirements within their forensic applications:
When scientists use Southern Blots for clinical or diagnostic purposes they use fresh
or dried blood samples from a known source. Thus, if a particular experiment gives
an uninterpretable result, the scientist need only obtain more blood from the patient
and re-perform the experiment. In forensic cases, however, the sample-say a blood
stain found at a crime scene, or a semen sample obtained from a rape victim-is
limited. If the experiment goes awry, there is no way to redo it. Thus, for forensic
purposes, there is only one bite of the apple. The forensic scientist must take special
pains to be sure that proper controls were utilized to ensure that the experiment was
performed correctly.
Id. at 969-70, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 993. The defense had urged that the transfer from clinical to
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ments, the court suggested that technicians perform a mixing (combined
sample) experiment to uncover and account for between-lane variations. 138
In addition, when a high concentration of DNA exists in one of the lanes,
the court recommended that the laboratory perform a serial dilution to en-
sure uniform band intensity. 139 In order to recognize degradation of a sam-
ple and ensure the proper run-length in the lane, the court recommended the
use of nonpolymorphic probes to identify a certain locus at a specific point in
the lane; if hybridization with a nonpolymorphic probe shows a band at that
region, no degradation has occurred to that point in the lane. 140 Non-syn-
thetic probes, manufactured by growing human DNA in a bacterial environ-
ment, have the tendency to hybridize with bacteria as well as human DNA.
To avoid this problem, the court favored the use of synthetic probes to en-
sure that hybridization produces only bands of human origin. 4 '
Addressing the inconsistency of the gender origin reports for the control
sample, the court preferred the use of both male and female controls to en-
sure accurate sex-typing.' 42 Finally, the court decried the use of differing
forensic testing should be accompanied by stricter laboratory procedures. See Memorandum,
supra note 94, at 15.
138. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 970, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994. In a mixing experiment, a 50:50
mixture of the two samples is placed in a third lane. A match should only be declared if the
third lane produces the same pattern as the combined pattern of each sample separately. Id.;
Lander, supra note 104, at 501. In forensics, however, it may not always be possible to run a
mixing experiment. Because additional DNA is needed to create the third lane, the sample
size must be of sufficient quantity to allow the mixture. Id. In Castro, the court recommended
a mixing experiment whenever a sufficient amount of DNA is available, but offered no gui-
dance where sample size would preclude the experiment. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 970, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 994. Paradoxically, both Lifecodes and Cellmark agree that a mixing experiment
is generally not possible in forensic cases because the sample size is frequently too small. Wex-
ler interview, supra note 10 (mixing experiments performed seldom to never); Stolorow inter-
view, supra note 10 (mixing experiment rarely performed and not a panacea). Dr. Lander
suggests that nonpolymorphic probes should be utilized "to verify that the lanes have run at
equal speeds and to provide standards against which fragment sizes can be measured pre-
cisely." Lander, supra note 104, at 501.
139. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
140. Observing the controversy surrounding D2S44, the court suggested that technicians
could have utilized a nonpolymorphic probe to test for degradation above 10.25kb in the watch
lane. Id. Karen Wexler of Lifecodes, however, admits that no probe existed for the 10-15kb
range at the time the test was run in 1987. Wexler interview, supra note 10.
141. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 971, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
142. Id. at 972, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 994. Lifecodes attributed the Castro mix-up to a failure of
communication within the lab. Indeed, many of the procedures criticized have been improved
since the Castro sample was analyzed. Karen Wexler reported that, when the sample was run
in 1987, the laboratory was new, with scientists mixing their own probes and technicians con-
tributing their own blood for use in the control lanes. The Castro sample was apparently
accepted as a pro bono project of the laboratory, and scientists used the sample to perfect the
testing procedures. The lab now uses a uniform DNA for the control lanes and has a separate
development staff to produce the probes. In addition, standard practice at Lifecodes now in-
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matching rules for RFLP's and the population data bank.'43
IV. INADEQUACY OF FRYE: A MODEL FOR FUTURE HEARINGS
Examining the Frye standard and other New York principles of admissi-
bility, the Castro court found the "generally accepted" requirement ill-suited
to manage the highly complex procedures involved in DNA typing.'4 In-
stead, the court chose to apply a three-prong analysis to the evidence:
Prong I. Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scien-
tific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic
testing can produce reliable results?
Prong II. Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist
that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA identification
and which are generally accepted in the scientific community?
Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scien-
tific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular
case? 1
45
The first two prongs represent the requirements of Frye for determining
whether the technique sought to be introduced is considered generally ac-
ceptable in the scientific community.'4 6 The third prong reflects the court's
own concern with Frye's inadequacy.' 4 7 The Castro court opined that, be-
cause the Frye test obscures critical problems that can arise in the applica-
tion of a particular technique, "a different approach is required in this
complex area of DNA identification. The focus of this [(Frye)] controversy
must be shifted. It must be centered around the resolution of the third
prong." 1
48
cludes extensive record keeping. Wexler interview, supra note 10. Cellmark does not type for
gender and hence does not encounter the male/female control lane issue. Stolorow interview,
supra note 10.
143. Lifecodes reported that a uniform matching rule is applied across the RFLP's and
data bank. The stated rule is that the bands must appear within 2% of each other. Both
Cellmark and Lifecodes employ the use of monomorphic probes, which identify a band at 4kb.
The probe is run on each sample and permits the lab to account for uniform shifting between
bands. Wexler interview, supra note 10. Though the deviation is measured, problems may
exist in extrapolating the deviation to show the shift in all of the lanes. Stolorow interview,
supra note 10.
144. "It has been observed that: 'Perhaps the most important flaw in the Frye test is that by
focusing attention on the general acceptance issue, the test obscures critical problems in the
use of a particular technique.'" Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (quoting
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1980)).
145. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
146. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
147. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
148. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
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If a court, in applying Frye, finds that the theory behind DNA fingerprint-
ing (prong one) and the techniques themselves (prong two) are generally
accepted, then resolution of the third prong, application of theory and tech-
nique to a particular set of tests, should command the case-by-case attention
of the court. Because no accepted standards exist that would permit a court
to dispense with the third prong, Castro's recommendation for a preliminary
hearing to determine admissibility offers a prudent way to determine
whether a laboratory performed the tests under reliable laboratory condi-
tions in a particular case. Castro's three-prong approach was recently
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Two Bulls.,
49
While the Castro court ultimately concluded that DNA forensic identifica-
tion evidence would be admissible under Frye,'5° it proposed a model for
future pre-trial hearings in an effort to ensure the reliability of the future
DNA evidence prior to admission.15'
First, the court proposed that parties be required to give adequate notice
of intent to offer DNA evidence if such intent exists.'5 2 This requirement
would allow both parties sufficient time to mount a rebuttal case or to seek
alternative testing.153 Currently, some state legislatures have already im-
149. 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990).
We fail to see how [the Castro] analysis is sui generis or that it in any way allows
intrusion of the court into deciding problems of weight vis a vis admissibility. When
the evidence is so prejudicial and the admissibility seriously challenged, trial courts
routinely hear motions in limine preliminary to the offer at trial.
Id. "This approach [to DNA evidence], whether it be under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702 or
Frye, should require the court to satisfy itself that the evidence meets all three tests laid out in
Castro." Id.
150. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
151. A pre-trial hearing should be conducted to determine if the experiments and cal-
culations performed by the testing laboratory in the particular case yielded results
sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. This hearing will also serve to aid the
trial Judge in formulating appropriate instructions to the jury in the event sharp
issues of fact emerge from the hearing.
Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99.
152. Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
153. DNA typing has proved useful both to convict and to exculpate a suspect. One of the
most notable exculpatory cases involved Gary Dotson, who was convicted and sentenced in
1979 for raping Cathleen Crowell Webb. Even while incarcerated Dotson maintained his in-
nocence, and in 1985 Webb admitted Dotson was wrongfully charged. Pleas for a gubernato-
rial pardon were ineffective, although Illinois Governor James Thompson did commute his
sentence to the six years Dotson had already served, subject to good behavior. However, Dot-
son's repeated parole violations sent him back to prison. Meanwhile, F.S.A. ran tests on
Webb's underwear and concluded that the source of the semen found there was not Dotson.
Dotson was granted a new trial and the state refused to prosecute. Moss, Free at Last, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 1989, at 19. In a context similar to the Dotson case, the District of Columbia recently
had the opportunity to consider its first case involving DNA evidence. Edward E. Green,
defendant in a D.C. rape case, hoped to introduce purportedly exculpatory DNA test results.
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posed a similar notice requirement on state prosecutors." 4
Second, the court would mandate that the proponent of DNA evidence
make available for discovery any books, quality control tests, sample reports,
or written reports of lab procedure (including the lab's matching methods),
as well as actual measurements and the standard deviation used.' 5 5 The
court would also require the propounder to produce a laboratory statement
on the method used to calculate allele frequency in the population data bank,
a copy of the data pool for each locus examined, and certification by the
laboratory that the same matching rule was used for both the sample and
population pool frequencies. In addition, the court proposed requiring a lab-
oratory statement on the presence of contaminants, degradation, or other
observed defects, and the steps taken to ensure noninterference with the re-
sults. Finally, the court would require the propounder to demonstrate the
chain of custody for each sample.' 56
Compared with the notice requirement, the documentation requirements
are certainly more onerous. The Castro court appeared to aggregate all the
points of the defense challenge: it produced a strict discovery requirement
that may ease the burden on subsequent DNA typing opponents 57 and re-
quired the proponent to bear the burden of establishing the proper perform-
ance of the tests and calculations. Once established, the burden of proof
would shift to the opponent to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the test results should be suppressed or modified.'5 8
If promulgated, uniform standards should find a place in Castro's recom-
mended three-prong preliminar.y hearing, a hearing which emphasizes not
only the accepted nature of the proffered DNA typing theory and tech-
niques, but also the reliability of a specific laboratory's testing procedures.
As evidenced by the Castro holding, it will be increasingly difficult to chal-
See Gellman, Genetic Testing Casts Doubt on Rape Victim, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1990, at D1,
col. 3. Armed with the test results, Green moved for a new trial. The motion was unopposed
and the United States Attorney's Office declined to re-prosecute the case. The court, therefore,
never got a chance to consider the DNA evidence. Gellman, DNA Test Clears Man Convicted
of SE Rape; Move Keeps Findings out of D.C. Court, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1990, at A12, col. 3.
154. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROc. CODE ANN. § 10-915(c)(1) (1989) ("If the State
decides to offer evidence of a DNA profile in any criminal proceeding, the State shall ... , [a]t
least 15 days before the criminal proceeding, notify in writing the defendant.., and.., make
available ... any report or statement to be introduced .... ").
155. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 979, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
156. Id.
157. Maryland has partially codified these prescriptions. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 10-915(c)(1) (1989) (The State shall "make available ... any report or statement to be
introduced.., and require the presence of any person in the chain of custody as a prosecution
witness.").
158. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 979, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
Beyond People v. Castro
lenge the generally accepted nature of the theory and technique of RFLP.
Thus, the third prong of the Castro model should command the attention of
courts considering DNA evidence. 59 As the RFLP technique becomes
more common and standards evolve, a proponent of DNA evidence will
likely need only show conformity with these standards; this showing may
then be sufficient to shift the burden to the opponent to prove that the results
are unreliable."
As a final matter, the Castro court declared that, in general, any issue of
fact concerning the reliability of the test would go to the weight, not the
admissibility, of the evidence. The results would only. be inadmissible where
the opponent could demonstrate that the specific tests performed were "so
unreliable." 6 ' As to what constituted the requisite unreliability, the court
offered only the test results in Castro.
16 2
159. Even if the reliability of a technique is established, the reliability of evidence de-
rived from that technique will depend on whether the technique was properly applied
on the particular occasion involved in the case. "Proper application" requires an
examination into a number of factors: (1) if instrumentation is used in the technique,
whether the instruments were in proper working order at the time the technique was
employed; (2) whether the proper procedures were followed when the technique was
administered; and (3) whether the person using the technique and the person inter-
preting the results were properly qualified.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-8.
160. As recently noted by the court in Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 565
N.E.2d 440 (1991):
In time, assuming one or more DNA testing processes come to be accepted, the only
questions will be whether an accepted process was properly followed in a given case
and perhaps the competence of the testing laboratory. At that point in the develop-
ment of the testing system, a voir dire hearing may cease to be necessary, at least in
certain cases.
Cumin, 409 Mass. at -, 565 N.E.2d at 442 n.7.
161. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 979, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
162. By unveiling the inconsistencies and errors in Lifecodes' procedures, the Castro case
may cast a shadow on the use of the Lifecodes test in other cases. In the Spencer v. Common-
wealth cases, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Tucker murder), reaffirmed en banc, 238 Va. 295,
384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990) [hereinafter "Spencer P']; 238 Va.
295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989) (Davis murder), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990) [hereinafter
"SpencerIP']; and 238 Va. 563; 385 S.E.2d 850 (Hellams murder), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171
(1990) [hereinafter "Spencer IIP'], the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the use of Lifecodes'
tests that featured the same polymorphic probes and experts as those assailed in Castro.
Timothy Wilson Spencer was convicted for the capital murder and rape of Susan Tucker,
Spencer I, 238 Va. at 278, 384 S.E.2d at 776, the capital murder, rape, and burglary in the
death of Debbie Davis, Spencer II, 238 Va. at 299, 384 S.E.2d at 788, and the capital murder,
rape, sodomy, and burglary of Dr. Susan Hellams. Spencer III, 238 Va. at 565, 385 S.E.2d at
851. Spencer was sentencedto death in all three trials. In all three cases, semen collected from
the crime scene was compared with a sample of Spencer's blood using DNA typing. Spencer I,
238 Va. at 280, 384 S.E.2d at 777 (Tucker); Spencer II, 238 Va. at 301, 384 S.E.2d at 790-91
(Davis); Spencer III, 238 Va. at 567-68, 385 S.E.2d at 853. Lifecodes declared a match and set
the statistical probability at one in 135,000,000 for the Tucker sample, 238 Va. at 280, 384
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V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE NEW TECHNOLOGY:
THE STATE OF MARYLAND
As technology progresses and the number of DNA cases proliferates, state
legislatures will undoubtedly address DNA typing. A number of states have
already provided funding for DNA testing facilities and identification re-
S.E.2d at 789, and one in 705,000,000 for both the Davis and Hellams samples, 238 Va. at 301,
384 S.E.2d at 790; 238 Va. at 568 n.2, 385 S.E.2d at 853 n.2.
In upholding the admission of the DNA evidence in each case, the Virginia Supreme Court
found the test to be "a reliable scientific technique," 238 Va. at 290, 384 S.E.2d at 783; 238 Va.
at 315, 384 S.E.2d at 797; 238 Va. at 573, 385 S.E.2d at 855-56, Virginia having recently
rejected the Frye test in O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 696, 364 S.E.2d 491, 504, cert
denied, 109 S. Ct. 186 (1988). While the Spencer court flatly rejected the application of Frye, it
noted that the RFLP procedure would have been accepted even if Frye had been applied. 238
Va. at 290 n. 10, 384 S.E.2d at 783 n. 10; 238 Va. at 315 n. 11, 384 S.E.2d at 797 n. 11; 238 Va. at
573 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 856 n.5. Thus, the Spencer court may have indirectly added to the Frye
equation; courts in Frye-governed jurisdictions might consult the Spencer court's dicta that
"even if Frye were the test in Virginia, DNA printing would meet that test." Id.; see GIAN-
NELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-5(c) (criticizing courts that use prior judicial
decisions to determine whether Frye's general acceptance has been achieved).
The court found both that the Lifecodes test was "properly conducted" and the evidence
was "undisputed." 238 Va. at 290, 384 S.E.2d at 783; 238 Va. at 315, 384 S.E.2d at 797; 238
Va. at 573, 385 S.E.2d at 855. The defense produced no expert testimony to rebut the prosecu-
tion's case. Id. In Spencer III, however, the defense objected to Dr. Richard J. Roberts' testi-
mony "that there was no disagreement in the scientific community about the reliability of
DNA print testing." 238 Va. at 510, 385 S.E.2d at 854. Spencer contended that the trial court
erroneously limited his cross-examination of Roberts on this claim. But because Spencer did
not provide the questions he wanted to ask Dr. Roberts, the issue was not preserved for appeal.
Id. Although it is unclear what a full cross-examination may have uncovered, the lower court's
decision appears ominous because the same Dr. Roberts would publicly distance himself from
one of Lifecodes' procedures in the Castro case, calling it scientifically unreliable. See supra
note 95. The Virginia Supreme Court, perhaps erroneously, mistook Spencer's inability to
challenge the test generally as an admission of the test's infallibility in the case at bar: "In-
deed, Spencer acknowledges that the evidence establishes that the DNA tests are accepted 'as
reliable within the scientific community' and that he 'was unable to find or produce one quali-
fied expert to debunk whether the theory of DNA printing or the statistic generated there-
from.'" Spencer I, 238 Va. at 289, 384 S.E.2d at 783.
Thus, the challenge found in Castro was conspicuously absent in the Virginia pronounce-
ment. Presumably, subsequent introduction of DNA evidence in Virginia will only be suscep-
tible to attack on the weight given to any particular test. This will be true not only for the
RFLP method, but also for the PCR, which was accepted by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Spencer IV. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 98, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621, cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 281 (1990). Without passing judgment on these results, Spencer I, Spencer II, and
Spencer III should be examined in light of Castro, especially since the same procedures, probes,
and experts were involved in each case. See generally Comment, Spencer v. Commonwealth
and Recent Developments in the Admissibility of DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 76 VA. L. REV.
853 (1990) (exploring the Spencer cases and DNA issues).
Drawing parallels between the specifics of the Castro and Spencer cases is impossible; be-
cause the quality of procedures may differ with the handling of each sample and the results
may differ with variables such as sample size, any defect in Castro cannot be imputed automat-
ically to the Spencer test.
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search.' 63 In addition, some states have prescribed the use of DNA identifi-
cation for paternity disputes. 6" Still other legislatures have established
DNA data banks to track known criminal offenders.' 65 While these data
banks operate like traditional fingerprint files, cataloguing DNA and its
wealth of genetic information raises serious privacy concerns that courts and
legislatures will be required to address. 166
Louisiana,167 Minnesota, 168 and Maryland 69 have enacted statutes specif-
163. E.g., 1988 Conn. Acts 77 (Reg. Sess.) (providing funding not to exceed $2.5 million to
develop a system of DNA identification for all law enforcement agencies); 1989 Iowa Legis.
Serv. 780 (West) (providing funding for DNA profiling equipment and staff); WASH. REv.
CODE § 43.43.752 (Supp. 1990) (charging the state patrol, in consultation with the University
of Washington school of medicine, with the development of a DNA identification system).
164. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-19-108 (Supp. 1989) (DNA testing allowed in paternity
cases to establish identity of putative father); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 187 (West Supp. 1990)
(same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-201 (1989) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-12 to -11-13
(1989) (same).
165. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West Supp. 1990) (blood specimen of sex crime
offender to undergo DNA analysis); FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (Supp. 1990) (DNA specimen re-
quired for specific criminal offenses); IOWA CODE § 13.10 (Supp. 1989) (DNA specimen as
condition of release for all felons and indicted misdemeanants); MINN. STAT. § 609.3461
(Supp. 1990) (must obtain and preserve DNA specimen for certain criminal and juvenile of-
fenders); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.43.754 (1989) (DNA specimen for felons and violent
criminals).
166. See generally Note, The Advent of DNA Databanks: Implications for Information Pri-
vacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1990); Hayes, DNA Fingerprinting Called Privacy Threat, Wall
St. J., Feb. 6, 1990, at BI, col. 1.
167. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.1 (West Supp. 1990) ("Evidence of deoxyribonucleic acid
profiles, genetic markers of the blood, and secretor status of the saliva offered to establish the
identity of the offender of any crime is relevant as proof in conformity with the Louisiana Code
of Evidence.").
168. In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis.., are admissi-
ble in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that DNA analysis provides a
trustworthy and reliable method of identifying characteristics in an individual's ge-
netic material upon a showing that the offered testimony meets the standards for
admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 1990) A companion section addresses a problem
with the statistical frequency data:
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, statistical population frequency evidence, based
on genetic or blood test results, is admissible to demonstrate the fraction of the popu-
lation that would have the same combination of genetic markers as was found in a
specific human biological specimen.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.26 (West Supp. 1990). Both of these sections must be read in light of
State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989). See supra note 28. The Schwartz court
found the Minnesota Rules of Evidence incompetent to ensure the reliability of DNA evidence.
447 N.W.2d at 424. The court, instead, reaffirmed its commitment to the Frye standard. Id.
The subsequent enactment of sections 634.25-.26 are clear attempts by the Minnesota legisla-
ture to remove the Frye requirement in future DNA cases.
169. Section 10-915 of Maryland's Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code, entitled "Admis-
sibility of DNA profiles," provides:
(a) Definitions-(l) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
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ically directing their courts to admit all DNA evidence categorically. In
light of Castro, these statutes may be a premature and unacceptably broad
recognition of the procedure. Recent legislative actions in both Minne-
sota 170 and Maryland 17' appear to eliminate the possibility of a preliminary
Frye hearing (or, for that matter, a Castro third-prong hearing) in criminal
cases employing DNA fingerprinting techniques. The Maryland statute also
reveals some challenging language that may require judicial elaboration.
First, the Maryland statute states that "[i]n any criminal proceeding, the
evidence of a DNA profile is admissible."' 17 2 "DNA profile" is defined as
"an analysis of DNA resulting in the identification."' 173 It is unclear, how-
ever, whether this definition means any analysis or a particular form. of
DNA analysis. 174 Since the only technique reported in any Maryland deci-
sion175 was Cellmark's RFLP, this analysis is possibly the only one contem-
plated by the legislature. 176
Consequently, the statute may allow non-Cellmark procedures to be ad-
mitted in Maryland courts. Statutory approval of these techniques (without
(2) "Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)" means the molecules in all cellular forms
that contain genetic information in a patterned chemical structure of each individual.
(3) "DNA profile" means an analysis of DNA resulting in the identification of an
individual's patterned chemical structure of genetic information.
(b) Purposes-In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a DNA profile is admissi-
ble to prove or disprove the identity of any person.
(c) Prerequisites-If the State decides to offer evidence of a DNA profile in any
criminal proceeding, the State shall:
(1) At least 15 days before the criminal proceeding, notify in writing the defendant
or the defendant's attorney and mail, deliver, or make available to the defendant or
the defendant's attorney a copy of any report or statement to be introduced; and
(2) Upon written demand of the defendant filed at least 5 days before the criminal
proceeding, require the presence of any person in the chain of custody as a prosecu-
tion witness.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-915 (1989).
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25 (West Supp. 1989).
171. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-915 (1989).
172. Id. at § 10-915(b).
173. Id. at § 10-915(a)(3).
174. Id.
175. Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 588, 556 A.2d 230, 235 (1989) (Cellmark single locus
procedure); Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 34, 559 A.2d 391, 392 (same), cert. denied, 317
Md. 542, 565 A.2d 670 (1989).
176. The legislative history of the statute offers little guidance. In the preamble to House
Bill 711, approved May 19, 1989, at the same time the defense in Castro was preparing to
conclude its attack on the Lifecodes procedure, William Donald Schaefer, Governor of Mary-
land, described the DNA technique optimistically: "[The] [m]eans of identifying that unique
DNA structure have been refined far beyond any previous means of human tissue analysis, to a
level of scientific accuracy that approaches an infinitesimal margin of error .... 1989 Md.
Laws 2892, 2893 (approved May 19, 1989, ch. 430).
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preliminary Frye-type scrutiny) promises to affect profoundly future chal-
lenges to new DNA procedures. In its current formulation, for example, the
statute would presumably allow the introduction of a Cetus-type test in a
criminal proceeding. Because the Cetus-type test is unknown to the Mary-
land courts and because it is fundamentally different 77 from RFLP, before
the results might be admitted, a judge should conduct a Frye hearing to
satisfy preliminary questions of reliability of both the theoretical and techni-
cal aspects of the procedure. Yet, the Maryland statute appears to extin-
guish inappropriately any challenge to the admissibility of DNA
identifications, whether Frye tested or not, in favor of a generalized examina-
tion of the weight of the evidence presented. Castro demonstrates that the
admissibility question has not been settled, even for existing and frequently
used RFLP techniques. To decree that future DNA identification methods
have statutory license for introduction in Maryland criminal proceedings
would vitiate the principles underlying the Frye and Castro safeguards.
If the Maryland legislature permitted its courts to follow the procedures
recommended by the Castro court, it might avoid the problems raised by the
premature admission of a new DNA technique and further ensure that par-
ticular applications of DNA fingerprinting tests are reliable before they are
presented to a jury.
VI. STANDARDIZATION
Some legal commentators have urged the admissibility of reliable DNA
typing test results, even in the absence of a national standardized system of
procedures. 178 In light of Castro, this confidence may be misplaced. Stan-
dards for DNA analysis in paternity disputes have already been published by
177. See Identification Tests, supra note 5, at 905 n.4 (Cetus procedures "significantly dif-
ferent" from those used by Cellmark and Lifecodes); Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 50
(Cetus techniques "differ markedly").
178. See, e.g., Identification Tests, supra note 5:
The lack of a standardized national system should not affect the admissibility of any
particular system as long as the test is reliable and the laboratory offering the test
uses sound testing procedures. Although the lack of a national system does create
some problems of uniformity, it does not affect the reliability of competing systems
and should not be a bar to their use.
Id. at 930. Determining whether a particular test is reliable, however, is difficult in the absence
of recognized and agreed-upon standards. Admitting DNA tests on a case-by-case basis allows
for disparate evaluations of reliability, even more so where the defense fails to challenge a
particular laboratory's application of DNA theory and technique. Moreover, where the evi-
dence is used in plea negotiations, the possibility for challenge is eliminated or reduced, and
without standardization, DNA evidence influences the criminal justice system and should be
governed by some minimum standards.
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the American Association of Blood Banks (A.A.B.B.). 17 9 While these stan-
dards should not be followed by forensic laboratories (because of the drasti-
cally different goals and uses of criminal evidence), some of the procedures
performed in Castro would have been unacceptable even under the less strin-
gent A.A.B.B. standards.' 80
Three separate studies have been exploring the standardization of DNA
typing procedures for forensic use. The Technical Working Group on DNA
Analysis Methods (TWGDAM), coordinated by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, is comprised of thirty-one scientists from crime laboratories na-
tionwide. '8 ' TWGDAM has released two proposals: one suggests minimum
guidelines for quality assurance in RFLP analysis 82 and the other offers a
model for creation and maintenance of a DNA data bank for cataloguing the
identity of violent criminals.8 3 TWGDAM's quality assurance guidelines
detail standards and procedures for operation of an RFLP laboratory, in-
cluding organization of the laboratory, personnel qualifications, and proce-
dures for documentation, materials and equipment, validation, evidence
handling, internal controls, analysis and reporting, and proficiency.' 8 4 The
TWGDAM guidelines are written broadly and are subject to revision as
technology progresses.
In July 1990 The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) published a
report designed to "illustrate a range of options for the U.S. Congress."' 6
The OTA study concluded that "[s]tandards are necessary if high-quality
DNA forensic analysis is to be ensured, and [that] the situation demands
immediate attention."8 7 The study identified two types of standards for im-
179. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, PATERNAGE COMMITTEE PRO-
POSED STANDARDS FOR TESTS INVOLVING DNA POLYMORPHISMS (rev. Feb. 1988) (on file at
the offices of THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, The Catholic
University of America, The Columbus School of Law, Washington, D.C. 20064).
180. For example, the A.A.B.B. standards require the testing of a known heterozygote
DNA in the control lane for each hybridization. As discussed supra text accompanying notes
115-17, Lifecodes failed to record the origin of the control lane DNA for the watch sample.
181. No commercial labs are permitted to participate in TWGDAM, although Cellmark
says that it has contributed copies of its procedures to the group. Stolorow interview, supra
note 10.
182. Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Guidelines for a Quality As-
surance Program for DNA Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis, reprinted in J.
KIRBY, supra note 39, app. I at 261-78.
183. Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, The Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS): A Theoretical Model, (Oct. 1989), reprinted in KIRBY, supra note 39, app. II
at 279-317.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 263.
186. GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 10, at iii.
187. Id. at 10.
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plementation: technical and operational.
[Technical standards] include such issues as proper reagents and
gel controls; electrophoresis conditions; rules to match DNA band-
ing patterns; the extent that computer-assisted matching should be
permitted; and the population data to compute the likelihood of
matches. Operation standards include elements such as record-
keeping and proficiency testing; they are likely to be more contro-
versial than technical standards, for historically, attempts to
regulate laboratory practices in any sector have met with
resistance .. 188
The study went on to say that "[a]ccreditation, licensing, and certification
are among the mechanisms of quality assurance that could be applied to
facilities performing forensic DNA analysis." ' 9  In addition to the
TWGDAM and OTA studies, a working group of the National Science
Foundation is considering the standardization issue and has yet to issue a
report on its findings.
Both Cellmark and Lifecodes say that they would welcome standardiza-
tion, insisting that their current procedures would meet any protocol pro-
posed by an authoritative source.' 90 However, commercial labs, such as
Cellmark and Lifecodes, might resist intense outside scrutiny because of
their proprietary interest in laboratory procedures. 19' Courts must balance
property rights in technical procedures against the more pressing need to
establish minimum uniform controls over those who can place seemingly
authoritative evidence before the criminal justice system.
In the context of Castro's third-prong-reliability of a particular set of
tests (as a condition for admissibility as a matter of law)-procedural stand-
ardization would serve as the needed objective measure for accuracy. Yet, as
evidenced by the TWGDAM proposal,'92 standards governing DNA typing
must be flexible enough to accommodate scientific advancement (and refine-
ment) of the techniques. The need for flexibility, however, should not pre-
vent establishment of parameters to govern both the RFLP and PCR
methods.' 93
188. Id. at 13-14.
189. Id.
190. Wexler interview, supra note 10; Stolorow interview, supra note 10.
191. During a recent Frye hearing, Cellmark was able to get a protective order covering its
confidential lab protocols. Thompson & Ford, supra note 4, at 59 n.71.
192. See supra text accompanying note 184.
193. The issuance of standards must be accompanied by some means of enforcement.
While the TWGDAM study appears to rely on peer-review and periodic audits, see J. KIRBY,
supra note 39, at 269, 273, it is possible that Congress will establish and enforce DNA typing
standards. Congressman Don Edwards, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and
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VII. CONCLUSION
The introduction of DNA evidence raises a multitude of questions outside
the scope of this Comment. 194 Yet, by itself, the Frye standard, emerging
from the Castro decision, appears unable to address the complexities of
DNA typing. In addition to the deficiencies found in Castro, Frye's 'gener-
ally accepted' standard poses other problems that will be evident in subse-
quent cases involving DNA evidence: because some Frye jurisdictions may
rely upon prior appellate decisions and peer review articles to test new pro-
Constitutional Rights, has said he is considering legislation "to bring about the development of
tough standards." Marcotte, Report: DNA Tests Valid' A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 26.
194. For example, the need for expert testimony in DNA cases is obvious; Castro demon-
strates the potential for successful challenge of DNA fingerprinting techniques. Does, then, an
indigent have the right to a court-appointed expert to rebut the prosecution's case? Quite
possibly, the complexity of DNA-dependent cases may trigger mandatory appointments; re-
fusal to appoint an expert may violate the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment guar-
antees. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980); cf. United States v.
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (when government uses expensive neutron activation
analysis as fact-finding tool, it must pay for similar tests performed on behalf of indigent de-
fendants), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). It is axiomatic that an indigent's successful chal-
lenge to the prosecution's case can only come from court-appointed experts. This is especially
true in jurisdictions applying the relevancy approach: "[T]he adequacy of the relevancy ap-
proach depends, in large measure, on full discovery, the opportunity to reexamine evidence,
and the appointment of defense experts. Without these safeguards, cross-examination and ref-
utation are difficult, if not impossible." GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at
§ 1.6(D). Although expert witnesses in almost every case will be needed to challenge DNA
fingerprinting, expert judges, versed in the intricacies of molecular biology, population statis-
tics, chemistry and genetics, will probably not be required. See, e.g., Bethune v. Azios, No. 01-
88-00874-cv, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988), 1988 Tex. LEXIS 2491 (overruling Motion
for Leave to File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus where relator filed a motion for recusal on
grounds that case involving DNA typing required a board certified criminal law specialist).
Because the DNA fingerprinting technique is in its infancy, serious questions will also be
raised about actual expertise of expert witnesses. Further, considering that the pool of experts
is currently limited, the scientific community may not easily accommodate demands of the
state and defense bars. Standardization of the technique should diminish these problems; with
an objective and widely recognized set of standards, a court may measure any given test and
weigh challenges to it.
Another problem that may be encountered and is most likely to arise where defense counsel
seeks to use the evidence for purposes of exculpation, see, e.g., discussion of Gary Dotson case,
supra note 153, is the preservation of the DNA sample itself. The state's duty to preserve
evidence for purposes of exculpation is limited. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988) (good faith failure by police to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence does not vio-
late the due process clause); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984) (no duty to
preserve breath samples; intoxilyer is so accurate that preservation is not likely to be exculpa-
tory); People v. Sims, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 105 (in the absence of bad faith, indictment
does not violate due process clause where police in rape case failed to reveal potentially excul-
patory DNA evidence). As the DNA technique travels through the courts, it is bound to
encounter resistance. This resistance, however, is wholly dependent upon a challenger's re-
solve and resources to mount an effective and comprehensive case against the introduction of
any specific case sample.
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cedures, 95 the potential exists, not only for great inconsistency among the
courts, but also for the admission of tests prior to challenge through the pre-
trial adversary process. Likewise, the general relevancy approach offers no
guarantee that DNA evidence will be excluded if the proffered tests lack a
uniform measure of reliability. 196
Because of (i) the deficiencies in laboratory application of the DNA identi-
fication technique displayed in Castro, (ii) the apparent lack of consensus
among scientists as to the proper reliable method of DNA analysis, and (iii)
the variations existing in DNA typing methods and procedures, laboratory
protocols, and the degree of compliance achieved on particular samples in
particular laboratories, courts should cautiously assess the reliability of spe-
cific test results prior to admission of the evidence.
In jurisdictions such as Maryland and Minnesota, where introduction of
DNA evidence has been summarily endorsed by statute, courts should fash-
ion pre-admission standards in order to ensure proper application of the
technique. And where these courts encounter a DNA identification method
that has not, in spite of generalized acceptance under a statutory rubric,
gained judicial recognition in their state, it would be both inappropriate and
inadequate to allow the results of a new analytical method to be introduced
without preliminary scrutiny of the technique's theoretical basis. Moreover,
in jurisdictions accepting the theory and techniques behind DNA finger-
printing, this judicial recognition should not be extended to embrace a labo-
ratory's dynamic procedural application to a particular set of test results.
Many of these problems, however, may be resolved upon issuance of au-
thoritative and harmonized standards governing DNA analysis. Yet until
standardization offers the needed objective measure of a particular labora-
tory's performance of DNA analysis, the three-prong approach to prelimi-
nary consideration of DNA evidence advanced in Castro, and adopted by the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Two Bulls, offers the only current method
of ensuring both the proper management of the technique and its reliability.
DNA evidence has revolutionized the field of forensic evidence. It has the
potential to offer an accurate method of identification that will, over time,
allow for a relatively precise means of both inculpation and exculpation. As
such, its introduction in the courts of the United States should be welcomed.
195. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-5(B)(3)-(C).
196. Unlike the Frye test, the relevancy approach does not attempt to assure the relia-
bility of novel scientific evidence prior to admission. Although some evidence will be
screened out by a court applying the relevancy approach, most innovative techniques
will gain admissibility, at which time any deficiencies in the technique should be
exposed through traditional adversary trial procedures.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at § 1-6(D).
1991]
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Yet, given the dramatic disparity between the few samples that have under-
gone judicial scrutiny and the reported number of samples tested, the poten-
tial clearly exists for unreliable DNA evidence to influence dramatically
criminal adjudication outside the courts' adversarial forum. Even jurisdic-
tions providing for pretrial scrutiny of DNA evidence should seek the stan-
dardized scientific consensus that will establish DNA fingerprinting as a
credible, evidentiary staple in the criminal justice system.
John Caleb Dougherty
